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FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS-PUBLIC EMPLOYEES MAY SPEAK

EVIlr-Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School Dis
trict, 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
A LITTLE

I.

INTRODUCTION

The first amendment to the Constitution! prohibits govern
ment2 from abridging citizens' freedom of speech. The simplicity of
this concept belies the difficulty' that courts have had in inter
preting it to guarantee fundamental first amendment rights to citi
zens who have become state employees. Traditionally, states could
legitimately condition public employment on the relinquishment of
first amendment rights by requiring loyalty oaths3 and other guar
antees of nonsubversive activity by their employees. More recently,
however, public employees' first amendment rights have begun to·
receive protection4 through a balancing of the interest of the state,
as employer, against the interest of the employee, as citizen, in
commenting on matters of public concern. 5 In conformity with the
progressive expansion of first amendment protection afforded pub
lic employees, the United States Supreme Court in Givhan v.
Western Line Consolidated School District 6 held that first amend
ment protection extends to the private communications between a
public employee and her employer.7 This holding significantly ex
pands the scope of first amendment protection previously afforded
public employees. Its subsequent treatment by the courts has ex
panded the contours of the first amendment for private citizens as
well. 8
1. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or pro
hibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the govern
ment for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. The first amendment applies to the federal government by its expess terms,
and to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145 (1968).
3. Gamer v. Board of Pub. Works of Los Angeles, 341 U.S. 716 (1951); cf. Bai
ley v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), afI'd, 341 U.S. 918 (1951). See gener
ally R. S. BROWN, LOYALTY & SECURITY 92-118 (1958); Morris, Academic Freedom
and Loyalty Oaths, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 487 (1963).
4. See notes 45-48 infra and accompanying text.
5. See notes 53-61 infra and accompanying text.
6. 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
7. [d. at 415-16.
8. Se"e notes 128-37 infra and accompanying text.
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FACTS

In 1970, plaintiff Bessie Givhan, a nontenured,9 black school
teacher, was transferred to the previously all-white Glen Allan School
in accordance with the tenns of a court-ordered desegregation decree
enunciated in Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School Dis
trict. 10 At the Glen Allan School, friction developed between Mrs.
Givhan and the principal, James Leach, over what she tenned "re
quests"ll for changes in practices she perceived to be racially dis
criminatory.12 As a result of this conflict Principal Leach recom
mended that Mrs. Givhan not be rehired at the end of the 1970
school year, and in fact she was not rehired. 13
Mrs. Givhan alleged that her dismissal was in violation of the
desegregation provisions of Singleton, which require that "objec
tive and reasonable nondiscriminatory standards"14 be used in se
lecting staff members for dismissal or demotion. She then filed a
class action 15 suit against the school district seeking reinstate
ment. 16 The court denied the class action suit 17 and dismissed the
complaint. IS Mrs. Givhan, however, was granted the right to inter
vene in Ayers v. Western Line Consolidated School District, 19
which addressed the school district's compliance with Singleton.
Mrs. Givhan subsequently intervened and sought reinstate
9. Mississippi public school teachers have been prohibited by statute from be
ing tenured from the time this case arose until the present. MISS. CODE ANN. §
37-9-17 (1972). The school can dismiss any teacher for any reason which does not in
fringe a constitutional right Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 555 F.2d
1309, 1314 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 439 U.S. at 410. Because of plaintiff's untenured
status she lacked an interest in continued employment. Id. This precluded plaintiff
from claiming a procedural due process violation, and none was asserted. Id.
10. 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1969), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Carter v. West
Feliciana Parish School Bd., 396 U.S. 290 (1969), on remand, 425 F.2d 1211 (5th
Cir. 1970).
11. 555 F.2d at 1313. See also notes 22-24 infra and accompanying text.
12. 439 U.S. at 413.
13. Id.at411.
14. Singleton required that "objective and reasonable non-discriminatory
standards" be used in selecting staff members for dismissal or demotion. 419 F.2d at
1218.
15. Suit was commenced in the names of Bessie Givhan, Mary Butler, and
Dolleye Hodges individually, and for the benefit of three classes of black teachers
and employees who had been discharged or not rehired by the Board of Education
of Western Line Consolidated School District. 555 F.2d at 1311.
16. Givhan v. Board of Educ. W. Line Consol. School Dist., 363 F. Supp. 714
(N.D. Miss. 1973), rev'd, 555 F.2d at 1309, rev'd, 439 U.S. at 410.
17. Id.at717.
18. Id.
19. 555 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated, 439 U.S. at 410.
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ment on two grounds: First, that nonrenewal of her contract vio
lated the rule enunciated in Singleton; and second, that it violated
her first and fourteenth amendment rights of free speech.20 The
school district defended its action on several grounds. 21 At trial,
Principal Leach testified to the race and discipline problems ram
pant in the Glen Allan School and to Mrs. Givhan's announced in
tention not to cooperate with him. Essentially, however, Principal
Leach's recommendation not to rehire Mrs. Givhan was based on
the "demands" she had made on him throughout the school year. 22
Principal Leach maintained that Mrs. Givhan was arrogant, antago
nistic, and hostile, particularly with regard to her "unreasonable
demands. "23 Mrs. Givhan had given him a list of what he termed
"demands" and what she termed "requests," which all involved
"Givhan's concern as to the impressions on black students of the
respective roles of whites and blacks in the school environment. "24
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Mississippi agreed with Mrs. Givhan, holding that nonrenewal of
her contract violated her first amendment rights. 25 The court found
that, while Mrs. Givhan had made "demands" on two occasions,
20. Id. at 1311.
21. The school district reiterated the reasons the district superintendent had
given Mrs. Givhan in a letter advising her of her dismissal. The three reasons stated
in this letter were: 1) Givhan's refusal to administer a nationalized test for her stu
dents; 2) her intention not to cooperate with the school administrators; and 3) an an
tagonistic and hostile attitude. Id. at 1312 n.6. Additionally, defendants attempted to
prove:
(1) That Givhan "downgraded" the papers of white students; (2) that she
was one of a number of teachers who walked out of a meeting about
desegregation in the fall of 1969 and attempted to disrupt it by blowing au
tomobile horns outside the gymnasium; (3) that the school district had re
ceived a threat by Givhan and other teachers not to return to work when
schools reopened on a unitary basis in February, 1970; and (4) that Givhan
had protected a student during a weapons shakedown at Riverside in March,
1970 by concealing a student's knife until completion of the search. The evi
dence on the first three of these points was inconclusive and the district
judge did not clearly err in rejecting or ignoring it. Givhan admitted the
fourth incident, but the district judge properly rejected that as a justification
for her not being rehired, as there was no evidence that Leach relied on it
in making his recommendation.
Id. at 1313 n.7.
22. Mrs. Givhan had given Leach demands seeking placement of blacks in the
"choice" ticket taking jobs in the cafeteria, better integration of the administrative
staff, and assignment of the black Neighborhood Youth Corps workers to semi
clerical tasks rather than solely janitorial positions. Id. at 1313.
23. Id. at 1314.
24. Id. at 1313.
25. 439 U.S. at 412.
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they had been neither "petty" nor "unreasonable" since they in
volved what Mrs. Givhan perceived to be racially discriminatory
practices. 26 In the court's opinion, plaintiff's criticism of the poli
cies and practices of the school board was the primary reason for
nonrenewal of her contract. 27 The district court, therefore, ordered
her reinstated.
Judge Gewin of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that no constitutional right had
been implicated in Mrs. Givhan's dismissal. Because Mrs. Givhan
had communicated privately with her employer, the circuit court
held the communication to be unprotected. This principle, that
"private expression by a public employee is not constitutionally
protected,"28 was asserted to be the "strong implication"29 of Pick
ering v. Board of Education,30 Perry v. Sindermann,31 and Mt.
Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle. 32
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit,
holding that first amendment freedom is not "lost to the public em
ployee who arranges to communicate privately with his employer
rather than to spread his views before the public. "33 Justice
Rehnquist stated that, although Pickering, Perry, and Doyle each
focused on protection of a public employee's public expression, this
fact was merely coincidental,34 and the rule to be derived from
these cases should not preclude protection of a public employee's
private expressions. 35 Givhan, therefore, was remanded in light of
the Supreme Court's expanded view of first amendment expres
sion. 36
This casenote will place Givhan in an historical perspective by
reviewing the gradual development of the law relating to public
employees' first amendment rights. With this background, the cir
cuit court opinion can be analyzed in the proper perspective.
Finally, the Supreme Court's holding and its subsequent applica
26.

[d. at 412-13.

27.

555 F.2d at 1314.
[d. at 1318.

28.
29.

30.
31.
32.
33.

[d.

391
408
429
439

U.S. 563 (1968).
U.S. 593 (1972).
U.S. 274 (1977).
U.S. at 415-16.
34. [d. at 414.
35. For a detailed discussion of Pickering, Perry, and Doyle, see text accompa
nying notes 69-73 infra.
36. 429 U.S. at 417.
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tion by lower courts will illustrate the significance and current sta
tus of the Givhan decision.

III.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES'
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS

A.

Historical Background

Historically, public employment was perceived as a privilege
which could be conditioned upon relinquishment of constitutional
rights. 37 For example, courts have upheld the validity of statutes
requiring dismissal of teachers belonging to "subversive organiza
tions"38 and prohibiting membership in organizations advocating
overthrow of the government. 39 The basis for this rule has been
traced to Justice Holmes' statement that a public servant "may
have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitu
tional right to be a policeman. "40 History illustrates that the condi
tioning of public employment upon the relinquishment of constitu
tional rights was a direct result of the theory that public
employment was a privilege, not a right. 41 Since it was considered
a privilege, the state had the power to impose conditions on public
employment which it could not impose on the population in gen
eral. As recently as 1952, the United States Supreme Court, in
Adler v. Board of Education, 42 reaffirmed this position by holding
that persons seeking public employment are subject to "the rea
sonable terms laid down by the proper authorities of [the state]
.... "43 While the right-privilege distinction held sway, states could
condition public employment on a variety of constitutionally imper
missible grounds. 44

37. See Comment, Development in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L.
REV. 1045, 1065 (1968); Comment, First Amendment Rights and Teacher Dismissal:
A Survey, 4 OHIO N. L. REV. 392, 392 (1977); Note, Judicial Protection of Teachers'
Speech: The Aftermath of Pickering, 59 IOWA L. REv. 1256, 1256 (1974).
38. See Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952) (court upheld validity of
statute requiring dismissal of any teacher belonging to "subversive organizations").
39. Garner v. Board of Public Works of Los Angeles, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
40. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216,220, 29 N.E. 517,517
(1892). See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitu
tional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
41. Id.
42. 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
43. Id. at 492.
44. See generally Adler v. Board of Educ., id. at 485; Fenstermacher's Appeal,
36 Pa. D.&C. 373 (1939); Van Alstyne, supra note 40.
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The Keyishian Case-Decline of the Right-Privilege Doctrine
In Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 45 the Supreme Court repu
diated the right-privilege distinction and specifically rejected the
basis on which Adler had been decided. 46 The appellants in
Keyishian were teachers who had been dismissed for refusing to
sign a certificate denying membership in any organization which
advocated overthrow of the government. The Supreme Court re
versed the lower court, holding the statute to be unconstitutional
because it was vague and overbroad, and ordered the teachers re
instated. The Court then enunciated a new, greatly expanded rul
ing to protect teachers. Academic freedom was characterized as a
"transcendent value" of "special concern" to the first amendment. 47
In conformity to this new standard the Court expressly rejected the
premise upon which Adler had been decided, "that public employ
ment, including academic employment, may be conditioned upon
the surrender of constitutional rights which could not be abridged
by direct government action. "48
Unfortunately, what Keyishian gave to the individual in in
creased constitutional protection, it took from the states by fail
ing to define explicitly the circumstances under which states
could limit employees' speech.49 For example, in several deci
sions the Supreme Court has noted the impact that teachers can
have on the minds of young people50 and on our democratic way
B.

45. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
46. Id. at 605-06. The Court again addressed the constitutionality of the
Feinburg Law, N.Y. Enuc. LAw § 3022 (McKinney 1970), which made membership
in the Communist Party a prima facie ground for dismissal. The Court held the "con
stitutional doctrine which has emerged since [Adler 1 has rejected its major premise."
385 U.S. at 605.
47. Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom,
which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers
concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the first amend
ment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the
classroom.
ld. at 603.
48. ld. at 605. Among the cases cited by the Court as leading to the result an
nounced in Keyishian were: Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961);
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S.
551 (1950).
49. Van Alstyne, supra note 40, at 1448; Note, supra note 37, at 1260-61.
50. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485 (1960); Adler v. Board of Educ.,
342 U.S. at 485.
A teacher works in a sensitive area in a schoolroom. There he shapes atti
tudes of young minds toward the society in which they live. In this, the
state has a vital concern. It must preserve the integrity of the schools. That
the school authorities have the right and the duty to screen ... teachers ...
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of life. 51 Commentators also have called attention to the teacher's
special role as interpreter of school board policy, a role which
requires the teacher to inculcate in students values consistent with
parental expectations. 52 Keyishian abandoned these important
state interests by failing to identify them as factors which the Court
should weigh in its decisionmaking process. Keyishian shifted rad
ically from the previous right-privilege analysis but failed to effec
tively account for the states' interest in the calculus of values to be
protected.
C.

The Pickering Case-A Balance

One year after Keyishian, in Pickering v. Board of Educa
tion,53 the Court addressed more specifically the extent to which
the state's interest as employer could be weighed against the em
ployee's interest in exercising his constitutional right of free
speech. Pickering was the first in a line of important cases 54 to bal
ance the teacher's first amendment rights against the state's own
legitimate interests.
In Pickering, a teacher was fired for writing a letter to the edi
tor of a local newspaper. The letter denounced the school board for
its handling of past proposals to raise new revenue and for its allo
cation of funds between the academic and athletic facilities. The
school board found the letter detrimental to the efficient operation
and administration of the school and ordered the plaintiff, Marvin
Pickering, dismissed. 55 The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the
dismissal on the ground that either the letter was not entitled to
first amendment protection or that Pickering had waived his consti
tutional right of free speech by accepting public employment. 56
The United States Supreme Court reversed the lower court,
ordering Pickering reinstated, and admonished the Illinois Su
preme Court for allOWing a state agency to infringe a teacher's conas to their fitness to maintain the integrity of the schools cannot be doubted.
[d. at 493.
51. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 79 (1979).
52. Miller, Teachers' Freedom of Expression Within the Classroom: A Search
for Standards, 8 GA. L. REV. 837, 846 (1974).
53. 391 U.S. at 563.
54. The three most important cases are: Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. at 274; Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 593; and Pickering v. Board
of Educ., 391 U.S. at 563.
55. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. at 566-67.
56. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 36 Ill. 2d 568, 225 N.E.2d 1 (1967), rev'd, 391
U.S. at 564.
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stitutional right to comment on matters of public interest in con
nection with the operation of the public schools. 57 Justice Marshall
then enunciated the Pickering test, the first aspect of which re
quires a weighing of the "interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through its employees. "58 This test specifically
prohibits the imposition of constitutionally impermissible condi
tions on public employment5 9 while at the same time recognizes
the state's need to regulate the speech of its employees in certain
circumstances. 6o By allowing states to regulate employees' speech
in certain situations, the Court corrected the major problem re
sulting from the Keyishian decision. Keyishian had granted exces
sive protection to employees' speech by prohibiting states from re
stricting employees' speech even when it would be reasonable to
do SO.61 The new test struck a reasonable balance between the fun
damental interests of both the employee and the state.
This new test's full potential remained unfulfilled, however,
because the Court failed to create a general standard for future ap
plication which detailed the weight to be accorded the state's and
the employee's interests. Instead, it provided only a general indica
tion of the interests which states can constitutionally assert to de
feat a teacher's first amendment right. The maintenance of disci
pline and harmony among superiors and co-workers,62 the proper
performance of daily duties,63 and freedom from interference in
the regular operation of the schools64 were recognized as
compelling state interests. In addition, the public interest in free
57. To the extent the Illinois Supreme Court's opinion may be read to sug
gest that teachers may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish First
Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on
the matters of public interest in connection with the operation of the public
schools in which they work, it proceeds on a premise that has been unequiv
ocally rejected in numerous prior decisions of this court.
Id. at 568.

58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Id.
Id. See notes 62-65 infra and accompanying text.
See notes 49-52 supra and accompanying text.

62. 391 U.S. at 570. The Court, however, does not indicate the level of discord
it will tolerate between supervisors and co-workers in attempting to enforce employ
ees' first amendment rights.
63. Id. at 572-73.
64. Id. at 573.
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debate 65 on matters of public concern was a factor to be considered
in some undetermined manner. The Court did not indicate the rel
ative values to be accorded these factors and left some confusion
regarding the proper scope of the state's interest. 66
The second aspect of the Pickering test was a New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan 67 standard for employee statements critical of em
ployers. Such statements, if false, could not constitute grounds for
dismissal absent proof that the statements had been made with
knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard for their truth
or falsity. While there may have been some confusion about the
weight to be given the state's interests in the Pickering balancing
test, application of the New York Times standard to employee criti
cisms illustrated the Court's insistence on a strong first amendment
right for public employees as well as for the citizenry at large. 68
Untruthful criticisms of an employer will have a tremendously neg
ative impact on the relationship between employers and employ
ees, yet, under Pickering, the employee is still within the bounds
of first amendment protection unless he makes the statements with
knowledge of, or reckless disregard for, their falsity. The Court
failed to account for this detrimental consequence, and it estab
lished a right of practically unhindered first amendment expression
for public employees.
D.

The Perry Decision-Support for Pickering

Two subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court, Perry v.
Sindermann 69 and Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Edu
cation v. Doyle,70 helped to extend and clarify the Pickering bal
ancing test. In Perry, a nontenured college professor was denied
contract renewal follOWing a series of public disputes with the col
lege's board of regents. 71 Robert Sindermann challenged his dismissal
65. ld.
66. See Note, Teacher's Freedom of Expression Outside the Classroom: An
Analysis of the Application of Pickering and Tinker, 8 GA. L. REv. 900, 917 (1974).
67. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
68. The Court, however, has characterized some forms of speech, such as ob
scenity, as unprotected. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957)
("obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press").
69. 408 U.S. at 593.
70. 429 U.S. at 274.
71. These disputes involved Sindermann's testimony before committees of the
Texas Legislature and a newspaper advertisement over the respondent's name which
was highly critical of the regents. 408 U.S. at 594-95.
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and brought two issues before the Supreme Court: First, whether
lack of tenure defeated his first and fourteenth amendment claims;
and second, whether the college's failure to provide him with a
hearing violated his due process right despite his lack of tenure.
The Supreme Court, affirming the Fifth Circuit, held that lack of
tenure would not defeat his first and fourteenth amendment claims
because the government "may not deny a benefit to a person on a
basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests
especially, his interest in freedom of speech. "72 Sindermann al
leged that he had been fired in retaliation for his public criticisms
of the board of regents' policies. The Court held that a bona fide
constitutional claim had been raised. Pickering was then cited by
the Court for the proposition that "a teacher's public criticism of
his superiors on matters of public concern may be constitutionally
protected and may, therefore, be an impermissible basis for termi
nation of his employment. "73 Within the confines of this first issue,
Perry reaffirmed the Court's insistence on strong support for public
employees' first amendment rights. The second issue, however,
laid the groundwork for the qualitative refinement of the Pickering
test subsequently adopted in Doyle.
Sindermann's lack of tenure did not bar his due process claim,
but it was relevant to the Court's analysis. Previously, in Board of
Regents v. Roth,74 the Court held that no constitutional right to a
hearing existed unless, despite a lack of tenure, a "liberty"75 or
"property"76 interest in continued employment could be shown.
Sindermann was able to prove that there was a de facto tenure
program 77 at the state college. He therefore had a "property" in
terest in continued employment and was entitled to a hearing.
72. Id. at 597. The Court went on to say:
For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his con
stitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms
would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the govern
ment to produce a result which [it] could not command directly. Such inter
ference with constitutional rights is impermissible.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
73. Id. at 598.
74. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). This was a companion case to Perry v. Sinder
mann, 408 U.S. at 593.
75. A liberty interest guarantees the plaintiff the right to notice and an op
portunity to be heard. Failure to provide notice and a hearing when due deprives
the plaintiff of a constitutionally guaranteed right. For a definition of a liberty inter
est, see Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 572.
76. Id. at 601.
77. Id. at 600-01.
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Placing the burden on the employee to prove he had some consti
tutionally protected interest presaged the Court's later refinements
of the Pickering balancing test as pronounced in Doyle.
E.

The Doyle DeCiSion-Refining Pickering

Doyle, a nontenured teacher, communicated to a local radio
station the substance of a school memorandum setting standards for
teachers' dress and appearance. The radio station announced the
dress code as a news item. Subsequently, Doyle was not recom
mended for rehiring by the school principal and was not offered a
contract by the school board for the following year. As justification
for nonrenewal of Doyle's contract, the board cited the radio sta
tion incident and another occurrence in which Doyle had made an
obscene gesture at two students. 78 The district court held that
Doyle's telephone call to the radio station was protected under the
first and fourteenth amendments. 79 Furthermore, because Doyle's
speech had impermissibly played a "substantial part" in the board's
decision not to renew his contract, it ordered Doyle reinstated
with back pay. 80
The Supreme Court, applying the Pickering balancing test,81
accepted the district court's conclusion that Doyle's speech was
constitutionally protected. It did not, however, accept the district
court's analysis, which lacked standards for future application. 82
The Justices were concerned that the lower court's rule would re
quire reinstatement in cases when the school board's decision not
to rehire would have been the same regardless of the teacher's first
amendment expressions. 83 Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unani
mous Court, held that a person's first amendment interest is suffi
ciently vindicated if he is placed in "no worse a position than if he
had not engaged in the [protected] conduct. "84 The Court sought

78. 429 U.S. at 282-83.
79. Id. at 283-85.
80. Id. at 283.
81. Id. at 284.
82. Id. at 283-84.
83. Id. at 285-86.
84. Id. Justice Rehnquist went on to say that:
A borderline or marginal candidate should not have the employment ques
tion resolved against him because of constitutionally protected conduct. But
that same candidate ought not to be able, by engaging in such conduct, to
prevent his employer from assessing his performance record and reaching a
decision not to rehire on the basis of that record, simply because the pro
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to insure that a public employee's exercise of a constitutional right
was not instrumental in his dismissal. At the same time, the Court
did not want to improve an employee's position simply because he
had exercised a constitutional right. The Court's goal, therefore,
was to devise a test that "protects against the invasion of constitu
tional rights without commanding undesirable consequences not
necessary to the assurance of those rights. "85
The test developed by the Court achieved these goals. In ad
dition, it advanced the development of the law in the area of pub
lic employees' first amendment rights while incorporating aspects
of previously established standards. Under the terms of the Doyle
test, a public employee first has the burden of showing that his
speech was constitutionally protected. 86 This portion of the test
was derived indirectly from Roth 87 and Perry88 and, by necessity,
incorporates the Pickering balancing test. Without first weighing
the competing interests of employee and state as required by Pick
ering, it would be impossible to argue that the employee's speech
was protected. Having proved that his conduct was constitutionally
protected, the employee must then show that "this conduct was a
'substantial factor' ... in the ... decision not to rehire him. "89 If
this burden is met, the onus is on the employer to prove by a pre
ponderance of the evidence that he would have made the same de
cision regardless of the employee's conduct. 90 This aspect of the
test distinguishes an impermissible result, that is, failure to rehire
solely on the basis of an employee's exercise of his constitutional
rights, from one caused by alternative factors unrelated to the exer
cise of constitutional rights.
tected conduct makes the employer more certain of the correctness of his
decision.
[d. at 285-86.
85. [d. at 287.
86. [d.
87. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 571, in which the Court required
Roth to prove that he had a "liberty" or "property" interest in continued employ
ment before he could seek reinstatement.
88. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 599, in which the Court held that the
opportunity for a hearing is predicated upon the employee proving the decision not
to rehire him deprived him of a "liberty" or "property" interest.
89. Mt. Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. at 287 (footnotes omitted).
This aspect of the test was derived from both the lower court decision and the Su
preme Court's previous decision in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1976), which held that a constitutional infringement must be a
"motivating" factor in a state action before it will be constitutionally impermissible.
[d. at 266.
90. Mt. Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. at 287.
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With this historical perspective, analysis of the Fifth Circuit's
opinion91 will shed light on the Supreme Court's subsequent rever
sal92 and will elucidate its significance in relation to Pickering,
Perry, and Doyle,
IV.
A.

THE GIVHAN CASE

The Circuit Court Opinion

Judge Gewin of the Fifth Circuit recognized that the decision
whether to reinstate Mrs. Givhan would be controlled by the re
cently articulated Doyle standard. 93 Under Doyle, the primary
question was the constitutional status of Mrs. Givhan's private
communications. 94 If her statements were constitutionally pro
tected, the burden then would shift to the state to prove that it
would have fired Mrs. Givhan regardless of her comments. 95 Nor
mally, the Pickering balancing test would be used to determine
whether Mrs. Givhan's' statements merited constitutional protec
tion, but the circuit court first sought to determine an even more
fundamental question: whether private communications could ever
be constitutionally protected. 96 Since this was a question of first
impression, 97 the court sought the answer in general first amend
ment principles and in the three leading cases of Pickering, Perry,
and Doyle.
The circuit court read Pickering, Perry, and Doyle narrowly,
excluding private communications by a public employee from con
91. See notes 93-108 infra and accompanying text.
92. See notes 109-27 infra and accompanying text.
93. Doyle was decided by the Supreme Court while Givhan was being consid
ered by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
94. The court of appeals accepted the district court's findings of fact. Signifi
cantly, the district court found that Givhan's dismissal was motivated primarily by
her "demands." 555 F.2d at 1315. Since the second aspect of the Doyle test had al
ready been satisfied, the ultimate issue was whether Givhan's conduct was consti
tutionally protected.
95. See notes 86-90 supra and accompanying text.
96. The court stated that before applying the Pickering test it "must determine
whether on the facts of this case the teacher had a First Amendment interest as a cit
izen in making complaints to the principal." 555 F.2d at 1316 (emphasis in original).
97. Prior to Givhan, only the Third Circuit had considered whether private
communications were constitutionally protected. In Roseman v. Indiana Univ. of
Pa., 520 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1975), cerl. denied, 424 U.S. 921 (1976), the Third Circuit
essentially held that private communications were not constitutionally protected. It
should be noted, however, that the Third Circuit applied the Pickering standard and
the speech was unprotected in part due to its "potentially disruptive impact on the
functioning of the Department." ld. at 1368.
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stitutional protection. 98 In each of these three cases, emphasis was
placed on the public nature of the employee's criticisms. 99 The
Fifth Circuit .believed that the dichotomy of protection it was es
tablishing between public and private speech was supported by
several recent cases. 100 Analysis of several of the cited cases,101
however, shows continued emphasis on the public nature of the
protected speech. In essence, the court read the language in these
cases so narrowly that a negative inference was derived from a vari
ety of public employment contexts. In other words, because only
public speech had been protected in the cited cases, the court
inferred that only public speech would be protected and that pri
vate speech was therefore beyond the scope of first amendment
protection.
As further support for his decision not to protect private com
munications, Judge Gewin invoked the "captive audience" ration
ale. 102 Principal Leach was considered to be incapable of avoiding
Mrs. Givhan's demands, requests, or complaints because they both
worked in the same building. 103 This proximity made the principal
a captive audience. Judge Gewin felt Principal Leach's privacy in
terest aided in defeating Mrs. Givhan's first amendment right, in
part, because of the high degree of captivity in the workplace. 104
The court did not want to force principals to become ombudsmen
for anyone interested in public education. 105 Judge Gewin, there
fore, held that "neither a teacher nor a citizen has a constitutional
right to single out a public employee to serve as the audience for
his or her privately expressed views. "106

98. 555 F.2d at 1318.
99. [d. at 1317-18.
100. See, e.g., City of Madison, Joint School Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976); Megill v. Board of Regents, 541 F.2d 1073
(5th Cir. 1976); Duke v. North Texas State Univ., 469 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1972), cen.
denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973). These cases were cited by the court at 555 F.2d at
1318 n.15.
101. Madison Joint School Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n,
429 U.S. 167, 175-76 (1976); Kaprelian v. Texas Woman's Univ., 509 F.2d 133 (5th
Cir. 1975); Lewis v. Spencer, 490 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1974), aff'g 369 F. Supp. 1219
(S.D. Tex. 1973).
102. 555 F.2d at 1319. This doctrine limits an individual's first amendment
right by preventing her from imposing her message on an audience incapable of
avoiding it.
103. [d. at n.16.
104. [d.
105. [d. at 1319.
106. [d.
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Since Mrs. Givhan's constitutional claim was defeated, the
court reversed and remanded the case for consideration of her Sin
gleton claim lo7 under which it was asserted that her dismissal was
not based on objective nondiscriminatory factors. lOS The court did
not consider application of the Pickering and Doyle standards be
cause there was no first amendment claim on which to rule.

B.

The Supreme Court Decision

Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous Court, reversed
the circuit court, holding that private expression of one's view is
constitutionally protected. lo9 In a direct rebuke to the circuit
court, Justice Rehnquist explained that the
decisions in Pickering, Perry and [Doyle] ... do not support the
conclusion that a public employee forfeits his protection against
government abridgement of freedom of speech if he decides to
express his views privately rather than publicly. While those
cases each arose in the context of a public employee's public ex
pression, the rule to be derived from them is not dependent on
that largely coincidental fact. 110

Having held that a public employee's private expressions were
9onstitutionally protected, Justice Rehnquist sought to explain both
the error in the circuit court's reasoning and Givhan's relation to the
analytical framework established by prior case law. Justice Rehnquist
briefly synopsized Pickering and the balancing test it established:
"the interests of the employee, as a citizen, in commenting on
matters of public concern," are weighed against "the interest of the
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public ser
vices it performs through its employees. "111 He then suggested that
the Fifth Circuit decision not to protect private communications
might have been based on the destructive impact Mrs. Givhan's
comments had on her working relationship with her superior.112

107. [d. at 1320.
108. See notes 10-14 supra and accompanying text.
109. 439 U.S. at 413.
llO. [d. at 414.
llI. [d. (quoting Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. at 568).
112. [d. at 414-15. "Here the opinion of the Court of Appeals may be read to
tum in part on its view that the working relationship between the principal and
teacher is significantly different from the relationship between the parties in Picker
ing . ..." [d. Recall that one of the factors to be weighed in the Pickering test is the
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Justice Rehnquist's subsequent language,113 however, indicates that
if the circuit court had held private communications by a public
employee to be constitutionally protected and then had applied the
Pickering standard, Mrs. Givhan's conduct still would have de
feated the school's interest. 114 In the same sentence, the Court
noted that the Pickering decision had been influenced by the lack
of any adverse effect on the working relationship between the
parties. Together, these passages suggest that the most important
factor in the Pickering analysis is whether the teacher's conduct ad
versely affects her working relationship with the objects of her crit
icism,115 but the language also suggests that the Court will tolerate
substantial interference by a public employee before first amend
ment expression is outweighed by the state's interests. This is
probably due, in part, to the fact that Doyle allows the state to dis
charge an employee if the state can prove it would have done so
anyway, regardless of the employee's first amendment expres
sion. 116 The Court's emphasis on the effect of speech on the work
ing relationship between the employee and the objects of her criti
cism clarifies Pickering by assigning a relative weight to each of the
numerous factors cited in that decision. In addition, the Court's
decision had the beneficial effect of expanding teachers' first
amendment right to express themselves while providing the state
with a means for discharging disruptive employees under the Doyle
test. It is significant that the Court continued to emphasize har
mony, discipline, and institutional efficiency as compelling state in
terests in the Pickering test, yet the overall weight of these factors
has been diminished due to the Court's willingness in Givhan to
tolerate potentially substantial interferences with the working rela
tionship.117
working relationship between the teacher and the objects of her criticism. See notes
30-34 supra and accompanying text.
113. But we do not feel confident that the Court of Appeals' decision
would have been placed on that ground [Le. interference in the working re
lationship between Leach and Givhan sufficient to justify nonprotection
of Givhan's speech] notwithstanding its view that the First Amendment
does not require the same sort of Pickering balancing for the private expres
sion....
439 U.S. at 415.
114. [d.
115. Id. at n.4. Included under the rubric "working relationship" are considera
tions of discipline, harmony, personal loyalty, and confidence which are necessary to
the proper functioning of those relationships.
116. See notes 86-90 supra and accompanying text.
117. See Smith v. United States, 502 F.2d 512,517 (5th Cir. 1974), which held
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Some exceptionally important language was relegated to foot
note four. 118 There, Justice Rehnquist explained that private com
munications are subject to a greater number of state restrictions
than public speech. When a public employee expresses herself
publicly, the content of the speech must be assessed to determine
whether it interferes with either the proper performance of her du
ties or the normal operation of the school where she is em
ployed. 119 Private expression, on the other hand, is under a
greater degree of restraint, being subject to both content assess
ment and time, place, and manner restrictions. 120
A significantly different level of protection is afforded public
and private speech. For public speech, Pickering focuses judicial
inquiry on the speech's effect on the working relationship and insti
tutional efficiency to determine whether the speech warrants con
stitutional protection. 121 In Givhan, the Court indicated that in ad
dition to content assessment, the time, place, and manner in which
speech takes place are additional factors to weigh in the Pickering
balance when private speech is at issue. These additional restric
tions affect a court's determination of whether particular speech is
protected by the first amendment, and they may preclude an em
ployee from obtaining consideration of reinstatement under Doyle.
Justice Rehnquist established time, place, and manner restric
tions on private speech because private speech frequently will have
a greater impact than public speech on the working relationship
between employees and employers. Public communications are less
likely to contain the acerbic tone that often is present in personal,
private confrontations; therefore, they are subject only to content
assessment. Courts are more likely to find speech protected when
only its content, rather than the time, place, and manner of its de
livery, is appraised. Consideration of the environment in which
speech takes place underscores the importance the Court places on
working relationships and institutional efficiency although the
that the employee's speech must substantially and materially affect the discharge of
duties.
llS. 439 U.S. at 415 n.4 (citing Pickering v. Board orE-duc., 391 U.S. at 564).
119. [d.
120. Private expression, however, may in some situations bring additional fac
tors into the Pickering calculus. "When a government employee personally confronts
his immediate superior, the employing agency's institutional efficiency may be
threatened not only by the content of the employee's message but also by the man
ner, time, and place in which it is delivered." [d.
121. See notes 57-61 supra and accompanying text.
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Court seems willing to allow a substantial interference in these
areas to protect the first amendment rights of public employees. 122
Following his discussion of Pickering, Justice Rehnquist turned
to Perry and Doyle and reiterated that the public nature of the
speech protected in these cases was not determinative of their out
come. 123 The captive audience rationale, asserted by the circuit
court as a justification for holding Mrs. Givhan's speech unpro
tected, was then destroyed in one sentence: "[h]aving opened his
office door to petitioner, the principal was hardly in a position to
argue that he was the 'unwilling recipient' of her views. "124 The
Court then articulated the rule of the case, that a public employee
has a first amendment right to express her views to her employer
privately. 125
Finally, the Court addressed Doyle's impact on the facts in
Givhan. Because Doyle had not been decided at the time Mrs.
Givhan intervened in Ayers, the district court had not been able to
apply the more refined Doyle standard. 126 Consequently, the cir
cuit court was unable to find that Mrs. Givhan would have been
rehired but for her criticism. 127 The decision of the circuit court,
therefore, was vacated and remanded to determine whether the
state would have made the same decision regardless of Mrs.
Givhan's criticism. Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion, agreed
with the circuit court that the state had failed to meet the Doyle
standard but nevertheless recommended remanding the case to
the district court to allow it to determine whether the state's Doyle
burden was met.
V.

POST-GIVHAN

In Givhan, the Supreme Court expressly held private commu
nications subject to constitutional protection. Subsequent cases
illustrate that this principle has not been limited solely to teachers
or public employees. Private communications have been protected
in labor relation disputes,128 and the principle also has been ex
122. See text accompanying notes 67-68 supra.
123. 439 U.S. at 415.
124. Id. (emphasis in original).
125. Id. at 415-16.
126. Id. at 417.
127. Id.
128. Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 313 (1979).
"[T]he Constitution guarantees workers the right individually or collectively to voice
their views to their employer." Id.
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tended to protect ordinary citizens' telephone conversations. 129
Courts also have held that involuntary transfers, not simply dis
missals, resulting from a public employee's speech, sufficiently chill
first amendment freedoms to warrant application of Pickering,
Doyle, and Givhan. 130
Cases construing Givhan have not, however, limited its princi
ple solely to private communication. In Janusaitis v. Middlebury
Volunteer Fire Department 131 and Barbre v. Garland Independent
School District, 132 the time, place, and manner restrictions im
posed upon private speech in Givhan 133 were held applicable to
both public and private criticism of an employer. 134 This expanded
reading of the Givhan opinion's footnote four language 135 works to
the detriment of public employees' first amendment rights. By ap
plying time, place, and manner restrictions to public speech, these
courts have added factors to the Pickering test which should not be
considered 136 in balancing an employee's right to make public
statements against the state's interests. In some circumstances con
sideration of the time, place, and manner of public speech will tip
the scale improperly against the employee. Once the employee's
public speech is ruled unprotected, Doyle is inapplicable, and the
employee is powerless to obtain reinstatement on the basis of a
first amendment violation.
Other recent cases illustrate that the Doyle test, approved in
Givhan, is the appropriate standard for proving causation in situa

129. Yoggerst v. Stewart, 623 F.2d 35 (7th Cir. 1980); Halperin v. Kissinger, 606
F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cen. granted, 48 U.S.L.w. 3750 (1980) (first amendment
provides citizens with a constitutionally protected right of free private discussion).
130. McGill V. Board of Educ., 602 F.2d 774, 778-80 (7th Cir. 1979).
131. 607 F.2d 17,25 (2d Cir. 1979). Janusaitis was a volunteer fireman with the
defendant fire department who publicly and privately criticized the policies and
practices of the department. Among other things, Janusaitis threatened to report the
department to the Internal Revenue Service for failing to keep accurate accounting
methods, frequently criticized the executives in the department, and contributed to a
newspaper account, which detailed his complaints.
132. 474 F. Supp. 687 (N.D. Tex. 1979). Barbre, an untenured teacher's aide,
claimed that she was discharged from her position for asserting at a public school
board meeting that her salary was below that required by Texas law. In addition to
her complaints at the public school board meeting, she also contacted members of
the Texas Legislature to determine the validity of the school board's implementation
of the applicable statute.
133. 439 U.S. at 415 n.4.
134. Janusaitis V. Middlebury Vol. Fire Dep't, 607 F.2d at 26; Barbre v. Gar
land Independent School Dist., 474 F. Supp. at 698-99.
135. See text accompanying notes 118-22 supra.
136. See notes 119 & 120 supra and accompanying text.
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tions involving improperly motivated dismissals. In Fisher v.
Flynn,137 a sex discrimination case, the court held that a plaintiff
must prove the "but for" causation, established by Givhan and
Doyle, before he or she may recover. Similarly, the First Circuit
employed the Doyle standard in Texas Instruments, Inc. v.
NLRB138 to determine whether improper motives led to employee
discharges. Both of thes'e cases illustrate the utility of the Doyle
test and the ease with which it can be applied to diverse fact situa
tions. There is no reason to doubt that the Doyle test will continue
to aid courts in. all cases involving questions of wrongfully moti
vated dismissals, whether they concern age, sex, race, or any other
form of discrimination.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Bessie Givhan was discharged from her teaching position for
privately expressing to the principal her dissatisfaction with school
policies and practices perceived by her to be racially discrimina
tory. The United States Supreme Court held that the first amend
ment protects the private communications of a public employee in
commenting upon matters of public concern. This holding repre
sents a radical shift from the earlier view that public employment
was a privilege that could legitimately be conditioned upon the re
linquishment of constitutional rights. It also represented the culmi
nation of a line of cases which sought to balance the conflicting fun
damental interests of the employee as citizen and the state as
employer.
Pickering v. Board of Education 139 was the first and most fun
damental step in the process of securing for public employees the
same first amendment rights guaranteed to all other citizens. The
test developed in Pickering balanced the teacher's first amendment
right to comment upon matters of public concern against the state's
interest in promoting the efficiency of its services. Unfortunately,
the Court left some confusion regarding the proper weight to be
accorded the various state interests, and later cases served to clar
ifY and refine the Pickering test.
PeITY v. Sindermann 140 reaffirmed the Court's insistence on
strong support for public employees' first amendment rights. By its
137. 598 F.2d 663, 665 (1st Cir. 1979).
138. 599 F.2d 1067, 1073 n.6 (1st Cir. 1979).
139. 391 U.S. at 563.
140. 408 U.S. at 593.
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allocation of the burden of proof between the parties, Perry also
established the groundwork for the test later devised in Mt,
Healthy City School District Board of Education v, Doyle. 141
The Doyle test remedied one of the major problems resulting
from Pickering. Prior to Doyle a state could not fire an employee
who had engaged in first amendment activity even if the state had
a legitimate reason for firing that employee. Doyle established a
test requiring the employee first to prove that his speech is pro
tected under the Pickering standard. Under this test, once the em
ployee proves that his speech is protected, the burden then shifts
to the state to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
employee would have been fired regardless of his speech.
Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District 142 repre
sents the culmination of Pickering, Perry, and Doyle. Givhan es
tablished Doyle as the standard for cases involving employee dis
missals which were motivated by first amendment expression.
Givhan also added several factors to the Pickering balancing test.
Most importantly, language in footnote four of the Givhan opinion
states that private communications are protected by the first
amendment, but that the private communications of a public em
ployee are subject to both content assessment and time, place, and
manner restrictions. Furthermore, the Court has indicated a gen
eral Willingness to allow a substantial interference in the working
relationship between a public employee and his or her employer
before the employee's speech will be held unprotected. The time,
place, and manner restrictions on private speech, however, indi
cate that it is easier to find a sufficiently detrimental impact on the
working relationship when an employee communicates privately to
his or her employer than when an employee publicly expresses his
or her ideas.
Subsequent cases illustrate that Givhan has been adopted and
read broadly by numerous courts, resulting in expansion of all citi
zens' first amendment rights. Several courts, however, have taken
an overly broad view of the time, place, and manner restrictions
placed on private speech by applying them to public speech as
well. This improper reading of the Givhan Court's footnote four
language unnecessarily limits public employees' first amendment
freedoms. Nevertheless, Givhan clarified the weight to be ac

141. 429 U.S. at 274.
142. 439 U.S. at 410.
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corded the factors set forth in Pickering and established Doyle as
the test for cases in which employees assert that their dismissal or
transfer was .unconstitutionally motivated. Givhan also established
constitutional protection for private communications in general,
creating rights which previously did not exist.
John A. Koltes, III

